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FIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT TREATIES:
A CRITICAL DISCUSSION
Gus VAN HARTEN*
This article examinesfive common justificationsfor the investment treaty system in order
to highlight aspects of the system that give causefor concern. First, it examines whether
investment treaties are a means to encourageforeign direct investment and concludes that
this expectation is contradicted by common provisions in investment treaties and is
unsupported by the preponderance of empiricalevidence. If thisjustification was a factor
in the decisions of states to conclude investment treaties - or of international
organizations to promote them - then these decisions appear to have been based on
incomplete knowledge and analysis of the anticipated benefits. Second, the article
examines the claim that investment treaties respond to the bias and unreliability of
domestic courts and critidiges investment treaties in this respect for being both underinclusive (by extending access to internationaladjudication to a narrow class of private
actors only) and over-inclusive (by failing to accountfor situations where domestic courts
offer jusice to a foreign investor). Third, the paper examines the claim that investment
treaty arbitrationadvances the rule of law in the resolution of investor-state disputes and
questions this claim after considering how investment treay arbitration fails to
incorporatekeg institutionalsafeguards ofjudicialindependence that are present in other
adjudicative systems that resolve public law claims. Fourth, the paper examines the
argument that investment treaties affirm the sovereigny and bargaining strategies of
states and outlines tentative evidence that governments did not test carefuly the
anticzated benefits of the treaties, did not appreciatefully the risks of investor-state
arbitration,and did not carry out sophisticated cost-benefit analyses prior to commiling
themselves to the investment treaty system. Finally, the paper examines thejusfication
that investment treaties were endorsed by the democratic processes of states and draws
attention both to the role of arbitratorsin giving meaning to the treaties and to certain
aspects of investment treaties that appear to undermine democratic choice. Based on this
analysis, it is recommended thatgovernments exerise greatercare when considering entry
into the system or, more likely, the maintenance or renewal of existing treaties, and that
governments consider optionsfor reform.

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Address: 4700
Keele Street, Toronto, Canada, M3J 1P3. Phone: 416 650 8419. E-mail: gvanharten[at]
osgoode.yorku.ca. Fax: 416 736 5736. The usual disclaimer applies.
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INTRODUCTION

The treaty-based investment regime incorporates one of the most powerful
systems of international adjudication in modern history. This system re-allocates
powers from states to multinational companies and from domestic courts to a
private arbitration industry based in Washington, New York, London, Paris, The
Hague, and Stockholm.' The system remains a recent development in
international adjudication, having emerged as a significant decision-making
process only in the mid-1990s. It is not surprising that there is apprehension
about the system and, in turn, that this has generated pressure for reform. The
initial source of such pressure in the 1990s was civil society, but a more recent
source is the governments of countries against which claims have been brought
by investors. For the most part, these are developing or transition countries. It
seems likely that new ideas and approaches to the resolution of investment
disputes will come from these states. 2

I I speak in particular of the roles played in international arbitration by large law firms
in these centres; and, more specifically, of the World Bank's International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and its International
Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the Arbitration
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).
2 L.S. Poulsen, Are South-South BITs any Dfferent? A Logistic Regression Analysis of Two
Substantive BIT Provisions, Paper for the American Society of International Law Biennial
Conference (November 2008); K. Miles, Imperialism, Eurocentrism and InternationalInvestment
Law: Whereto From Herefor Asia?, Paper for the Second Biennial General Conference of
the Asian Society of International Law (August 2008) (hereinafter Miles).

Spring, 2010]1

Justificationsfor Investment Treaties:A Critique

21

In this article I canvass a number of issues that arise in debates about the
investment regime. The aim is to identify elements of investment treaties and
investment arbitration that give cause for concern. The discussion is presented as
a series of responses to five justifications offered for the system in academic,
trade literature or public commentary. 3 The main sources for this discussion are
the texts of investment treaties, awards of arbitration tribunals, and academic
literature. The article does not aspire to a comprehensive or systematic empirical
review nor does it claim to supply any definitive answers to the questions it raises.
Rather, the aim is to elaborate some concerns about the system and, in this
4
manner, encourage discussion of a system which, as I among others have argued,
requires reform.

II. PRESSURE FOR REFORM
Expectations of reform of the investment regime stem from recent events.
First, from the late 1990s, there was an awakening of sorts in the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico on the sheer significance of the powers allocated to foreign investors
and to arbitrators under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).5 This led to modest but important reforms of NAFTA
3 See, for example, the work of Charles N. Brower, Jan Paulsson, Thomas Walde,
Daniel M. Price, Todd Weiler, Ian A. Laird, Charles H. Brower II, Susan D. Franck, and
Stephan Schill. Throughout the paper, I refer periodically to exemplary publications of
these and other authors on specific justifications for the system; in this respect, J.
PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press
2005), at ch. 9 (hereinafter PAULSSON) provides a useful summary of various justifications
for the system and is referred to on a number of issues below. Promotional material is
also common in informational publications produced by the law firms that work in the
field; e.g. S. Noury & C. Richard (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP), International
Arbitration in Latin America: Overview and Recent Developments, in INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2009, at 282 (Global
Legal Group 2009) ("Latin American states for years rejected arbitration due to the
suspicion that it granted greater rights to foreign investors.... Over the last 30 years, great
advances have been made towards the abandonment of this isolationist policy....
However, the ghost of Dr. Calvo still lingers on in the form of pockets of resistance to
arbitration both within the judiciary... and the government.").
4 G. Van Harten, A Casefor an InternationalInvestment Court, SIEL Working Paper No.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
available
at:
(June
2008),
22/08
abstractid=1153424; G. VAN

HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND

PUBLIC LAW (Oxford University Press 2007), at ch. 7 (hereinafter VAN HARTENINVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION).

5 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the
Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of
America, December 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, at ch. 11 (hereinafter NAFTA). Awareness
of these issues also developed via the debate in the mid-1990s over the OECD's
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investment arbitration, including steps to make it more open and to limit the
interpretive discretion of arbitrators. 6 In addition, the U.S. and Canada
subsequently revisited their policies on investment treaties in an attempt to clarify
loose language on the concepts of expropriation and "fair and equitable"
treatment and to expand exceptions for financial measures, for example.7 This
experience suggested that the NAFTA states did not originally anticipate the full
implications of NAFTA Chapter 11. A similar suggestion arose more recently
when officials from two major developing states - Pakistan and South Africa reported that their governments did not appreciate the risks of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) when they were concluded in the 1990s and that such
treaties must receive closer scrutiny.8
More recently, a tentative trend toward more fundamental reform has
emerged in Latin America.9 In 2007, Bolivia withdrew from the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and Ecuador excluded
disputes over natural resources from its consent to the ICSID Convention. 0 In

proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), a project that was abandoned
after France's withdrawal from the negotiations, the expression of reservations by various
governments, and widespread opposition from civil society organizations in North and
South. C. Lalumiere and J. P. Landau, Report on the MultilateralAgreement on Investment
(MAI), Interim Report to the Government of France (September 1998); E. Smythe,
Domestic and InternationalSources of Regime Change: Canada and the Negotiation of the OECD
MulilateralAgreementon Investment, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian
Political Science Association, St. John's, Nfld. (8 June, 1997), at 9-10; A. Walter, NGOs,
Business, and InternationalInvestment: The MultilateralAgreement on Investment, Seattle, and Beyond,
7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51, 58-60 (2001).
6 Free Trade Commission (NAFTA), Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions (30 July, 2001), 13(6) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 139, available at:
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.
7 A. Newcombe, Canada's New Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement, 30(14)
BULL.
(2004), available at: www.ccilCOUNCIL
ON INT'L L.
CANADIAN
ccdi.ca/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=89&Itemid= 112; See also the
"May 101h" U.S. Administration-Congressional Agreement on Trade Policy, reproduced in
the letter of May 10, 2007 from the Chairs of the U.S. House of Representatives'
Committee on Ways & Means and Subcommittee on Trade to the U.S. Trade
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Media/
available
at:
Representative,
pdf/1 10/05%2014%2007/05%2014%2007.pdf.
8 Republic of South Africa, infra note 55, 95.
9 I.A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, Research paper
(2009), available at: http://works.bepress.com/ignacio-vincentelli/l.
10 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Diputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, 18 March, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (hereinafter ICSID Convention). L.E. Peterson,
Ecuador becomes second state to exit ICSID system; LAReporter reviewfinds that approximatey two-
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July 2009, Ecuador went further and denounced the ICSID Convention
outright." Venezuela withdrew from its BIT with the Netherlands (whose BITs
have been used by forum-shopping investors to bring claims against the opposite
state party via holding companies in the Netherlands).1 2 Various states have also
announced plans to establish an arbitration forum within the Union of South
American Countries (UNASUR) as an alternative to ICSID.13 Governments have
also pushed foreign investors to renegotiate investment contracts, especially in
the resource sector, and have reportedly modified their approach to investment
contracts so as to require foreign investors to waive their right to pursue
investment treaty arbitration in the event of a dispute arising from the contract.14
Perhaps most importantly, in 2008, Ecuador terminated eight BITs which
were deemed to be unsuccessful in stimulating new investment's and, in October
2009, President Rafael Correa reportedly proposed to the country's Congress that
Ecuador should withdraw from 13 additional BITs dating from the 1990s.16
These include Ecuador's BITs with six conventional capital-exporters in Europe
and North America (U.S., U.K., Germany, France, the Netherlands, and
Canada)17 as well as China. Ecuador's stance apparently reflects a wider policy
choice to accept foreign investment from China as an alternative to Western
capital. It remains to be seen whether China is prepared to make such investment
without requiring the treaty-based protections sought and designed by the West
and whether China will rely on other means to avoid or manage political risks.
thirds of treat claims against Ecuadorhave been brought to ICSID, 2(12) INVESTMENT ARB. REP.

(17 July, 2009), available at: www.iareporter.com.
'1 F. Cabrera Diaz, Ecuadorpreparesfor ife after ICSID, while debate continues over efect of its
exitfrom the Centre, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (September 2009) at 3.
L.E. Peterson, Venezuela surprises the Netherlands with termination notice for BIT treaty
has been used by many investors to "route" investments into VeneZuela, 1(1) INVESTMENT ARB.
12

REP. (16 May, 2008), availableat: www.iareporter.com.
13F. Cabrera Diaz, South American alternativeto ICSID in the works asgovernments create an
energy treaty, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (6 August, 2008).
14 A. Romanetti, Preventing the Abuse of Muliple and Concurrent Arbitration Proceedings:
Waiver Clauses, Draft paper (2009)

1s These steps by Ecuador are especially important because they remove the state's
underlying consents to the compulsory arbitration of investor claims and because they do
so in relation to treaties that apply to large amounts of capital flows or potential capital
flows into Ecuador. In doing so, they return Ecuador to the legal position that it occupied
before 1995 when the first of its BITs with a major capital-exporter (the UK) was

concluded; L.E. Peterson, Ecuadorian President reportedly asks Congress to terminate 13 BITs;
move comes on heels of earlier termination of multfile BITs, 2(17) INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (30

October, 2009).
16 UNCTAD,

Country-sperfic list of BITs, available at: www.unctad.org/Templates

/Page.asp?intItemlD=2344&lang= 1 (hereinafter UNCTAD List).
17 Major Capital-Exporters, infra note 22.
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It should be stressed that, even in Latin America, this push back against the
system, while very significant, does not necessarily reflect a broad movement in
the region (given the ongoing adherence of other countries, especially Argentina,
to their treaties and to ICSID). Even so, these recent developments reflect
widespread doubts about the system. The arbitration mechanism, especially, has
gained notoriety as more investors have brought aggressive claims against
governments in matters of general public policy, as arbitrators have adopted
expansive readings of their own jurisdiction and of substantive standards under
the treaties,' 8 and as some very large awards have been issued against states. 9
The timing of recent reforms is also significant. Some argue that it reflects a
wider malaise of the corporate neoliberal model - based on the upward transfer
of wealth, constraint of government, and liberalization of markets 20 - that has
been associated with Anglo-American and Bretton Woods politics since the
1980s. 21 Investment treaty arbitration is an important legal and institutional piece
of the neoliberal puzzle because it imposes exceptionally powerful legal and
economic constraints on governments and, by extension, on democratic choice,
in order to protect from regulation the assets of multinational firms. It is unlikely
that the break-out period of BITs in the late 1980s and early 1990s coinciding
with the heyday of the Washington Consensus was a coincidence. This was a
period in which large numbers of treaties were concluded by disparate countries
with the cumulative effect of expanding the system well beyond its origins in the
D. SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING EcONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 71-73,
95-108 (Cambridge University Press 2008) (hereinafter SCHNEIDERMAN); B. Choudhury,
18

Recapturing PublicPower: Is Investment Arbitration'sEngagement of the Public Interest Contributing to
the Democratic Defidt?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 793-95 (2008) (hereinafter
Choudhury).
19 E.g. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v Slovak Republic (24 May, 1999), 14 ICSID
REV. 251, 17(3) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 189 ($1.05 billion (U.S.; all amounts

in this footnote are approximated including interest)); CME Republic BV v Czech
Republic (13 September, 2001), 14(3) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 109 ($350
million); CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (12 May, 2005), 44
I.L.M. 1205, 17(5) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 63 ($149 million).
20 D. HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 15-19 (Oxford University

Press 2005).
21

M. Sornarajah, The Clash of Globaligationsand the InternationalLaw on Foreign Investment,

Paper for the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Simon Reisman Lecture
in International Trade Policy, Ottawa (12 September, 2002), available at:
http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/pdf/papers/sornarajah.pdf; I.T. Odumosu, The Aninomies of
the (Continued)Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 345 (2007); S.
Spronk & C. Crespo, Water, National Sovermignty and Social Resistance: Bilateral Investment
Treaties and the Struggles against Multinational Water Companies in Cochabamba and El Alto,
Bolivia, 1 L.,
Soc.
JUST.
&
GLOBAL
DEV.
J. (2008), available at:

http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/20081 /spronkcrespo.
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treaty networks of the 12 major capital-exporters (even if those treaty networks
remain the core of the system in that they have generated roughly 90% of known
investor claims). 22
In 1989, according to UNCTAD, there were 385 BITs, whereas by 1995
23
there were 1173, and by 2000 there were 1941 (although not all were in force).
In Latin America, by 1989, just two countries (Belize and Panama) had agreed to
a compulsory investor-state arbitration mechanism in a BIT with one of the 12
major capital-exporters; by 2005, another 10 countries in the region had done so
(Uruguay, Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Chile, Mexico, Ecuador,
and Nicaragua). 24 Among the emerging economies of China, India, and Brazil,
only the former - which ratified numerous BITs in the 1980s as part of its
economic liberalisation reforms of the period - had concluded a BIT with a
major capital-exporter before 1990, and only after 2000 did China incorporate
broad consents to investor-state arbitration in such treaties. 25 India's first BITs
with a major capital-exporter came into force only in 1998 (with Germany and
26
Italy, both signed in 1995) whereas Brazil has declined to ratify any BITs.

22 These 12 major capital-exporters are the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, the
Netherlands, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Japan, Spain, Belgium, Canada, and Italy. The 12
are listed in order of total FDI outward stock for 2008 as reported in UNCTAD, World
Investment Report 2009, 251-54 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2009) (hereinafter
Major Capital-Exporters). In my own informal tracking of 396 known treaty-based claims
where the relevant data was reported in publicly available awards or in news reporters
(Investment Arbitration Reporter, Investment Treaty News) as of May 2009, I found that 9 0%
(357) of the claims were brought by a national of one of these 12 capital-exporters against
a developing or transition country pursuant to a BIT between the two states, to NAFTA,
or to the Energy Charter Treaty (annex I of the Final Act of the European Energy Charter
Conference) (Lisbon, 17 December, 1994; 34 I.L.M. 373). Note that I did not attempt to
account for forum-shopping in collecting this descriptive data. Note also that Hong Kong
and Japan accounted for none of the 357 claims.
23 UNCTAD, Quantitative data on bilateral investment treaties and double taxation treaties
(2002), available at: www.unctad.org/templates/WebFlyer.asp?intltemlD=3150&ang=l.
24 UNCTAD list, supra note 16.
25 These included BITs with three major capital-exporters (U.K., Japan, and Italy)
during 1986-89. However, China did not conclude any further BITs with the major
capital-exporters until after 2000. Since that year, three BITs between China and
Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, respectively, have been signed and entered into
force. UNCTAD List, supra note 16. On the BRIC countries and the investment treaty
system, see M. Mortimore & L. Stanley, Justice Denied: Dispute Settlement in Latin America's
Trade and Investment Agreements, Working Group on Development and Environment in the
Americas Discussion Paper No. 27 (October 2009), at 24-32, available at:
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/WorkingGroup.htm (hereinafter Mortimore & Stanley).
26 UNCTAD List, supra note 16.
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Even so, whether for reasons of ideology or rational choice 27 and whether as
a response to structural pressures at the international level 28 or state capture by
domestic economic elites,29 most countries joined the present regime in the
1
990s. In doing so, they endorsed international arbitration as a governing
arrangement to regulate and discipline their governments on behalf of foreign
investors (but not vice versa) more directly and more comprehensively than any
international adjudicative regime since the colonial era. 30
III. Focus ON "MUSCULAR" INVESTMENT TREATIES
In examining this system, the discussion in this article focuses on five
justifications commonly offered to support the system in its bold but nevertheless
widespread form. Looking primarily at the treaties concluded by the major
European and North American capital-exporters - whose nationals have brought
the great majority of known claims 3 1 - as interpreted (often expansively) by
investment arbitration tribunals, one may identify these "muscular" elements of
the system:
*

*

*

*

Investors are authorised to bring claims against states in relation to most
or all aspects of the treaty rather than a more limited class of potential
disputes, such as those involving the amount of compensation to be paid
in the event of an expropriation.
Investors can bring claims in arbitration forums at which voting power is
concentrated in the major capital-exporting states (e.g. the World Bank)
or an international business organisation (e.g. the International Chamber
of Commerce).
Investors can bring claims without having to exhaust local remedies in
the host state, regardless of whether those remedies are capable of
delivering justice.
Investors can submit contractual disputes with the host state or a state
entity to the arbitration mechanism under the investment treaty, even

27 A. Guzman, Why developing countries sign treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularity
of BITs, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 553 (1998); R.J. Bubb & S. Rose-Ackerman, BITs and bargains:
Strategic aspects of bilateral and multilateral regulation offoreign direct investment, 27 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 291 (2007).
28 Z. Elkins, A.T. Guzman & B.A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811 (2006) (hereinafter Elkins,

Guzman & Simmons).
29 L. Collinson, Explaining Pareto-Inefficient International Cooperation Using Argentina's
Bilateral Investment Treaties, DESTIN Working Paper No. 08-87 (2008), at 22-5, available at:

www.1se.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/WP87.pdf (hereinafter Collinson).
3o VAN HARTEN-INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at ch 2.
31 Major Capital-Exporters, supra note 22.
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where the contract itself requires the resolution of disputes in another
forum.
Investors can forum-shop, i.e. they can acquire the status of a "foreign
investor" under a treaty merely by establishing a holding company in a
state party to that treaty.
Arbitrators are authorized to regulate and discipline states based on
broadly framed standards, such as protections from "unfair" or
"inequitable" treatment and from "expropriation" or "deprivation";
Arbitrators are authorized to review the conduct of virtually any branch
or entity of the state;
Arbitrators are authorized to award money damages, as opposed to
conventional public law remedies, where the state is found
retrospectively to have violated its treaty obligations;
Host states submit to pre-establishment national treatment for foreign
32
investors rather than simply post-establishment non-discrimination.
Host states submit to a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause that is open
to expansive interpretation by arbitrators such that it incorporates
procedural and substantive elements in other investment treaties as
requirements of MFN treatment.
Foreign states are authorized to enforce an award against an unsuccessful
state based on the recognition and enforcement provisions of the ICSID
Convention, the New York Convention, and/or the Panama
Convention. 33

Most investment treaties incorporate many of these elements; many
investment treaties reflect all or virtually all of them. These elements have all been
defended, explicitly or implicitly, by advocates of the system, many of whom - it
is important to highlight - are part of or closely connected to the investment
arbitration industry. 34 Moreover, advocates of the system usually do not
32 This element is limited to the U.S. model of investment treaty (which was emulated
by Canada after NAFTA) although European countries have sought to incorporate this
element into their treaty networks by concluding Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) that adopt a positive list approach to pre-establishment national treatment as a
complement to existing BIT networks of European states. G. Van Harten, Investment

Provisions in Economic Partnership Agreements, Research paper (March 2008), available at:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1461110.
33 ICSID Convention, supra note 10; United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3,
entered into force 7 June, 1959) (hereinafter the New York Convention); Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama, 30 January, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 336) (hereinafter the Panama Convention).
By "investment arbitration industry", I refer broadly to persons who sit as
3
investment arbitrators; to key actors in the major organizations for international

28
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differentiate between these elements of the treaties so as to reject one or another
muscular component. 35 Rather, most advocates tend to promote the system as a
whole and, if they do differentiate among these elements, they tend to favour the
system in its bold form. For these reasons, it is appropriate to focus on this
muscular version of the treaties in a discussion of justifications for the system.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Justification 1: Investment Treaties are a Means to EncourageForeign Investment

A common argument in support of the system is that it is a means for states
to encourage foreign investment into their territory (especially from the other
state party to the treaty). 36 Thus, we might say that Ecuador, wishing to encourage
investment from the U.S., could conclude an investment treaty with the U.S. in
order to signal its commitment to accept and protect U.S. investors, thus
encouraging them to invest in Ecuador rather than another locale. The logic may
appear almost self-evident. However, there are a number of difficulties with this
justification, arising both from the text of investment treaties and from the
empirical evidence.
Here, let me highlight three points about the text of investment treaties
which raise difficulties. The first is that many of the treaties take a liberal
approach to forum-shopping. Put differently, they allow owners of assets to pick
and choose among nationalities at their convenience for the purpose of bringing
investment treaty claims against countries in which they own assets. An investor
may acquire the nationality of a state party to the treaty, thus gaining access to the
commercial and investment arbitration, such as the International Chamber of Commerce,
the London Court of International Arbitration, and the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce; and to lawyers and legal experts who derive substantial income from the
litigation of investment treaty claims. Notably, the business model of the industry is built
essentially on the payment of legal and arbitration fees by claimants and by states and on
the promise of payment of compensation to investors, especially by governments of
developing and transition countries.
3s Supra note 3.
36 See, for example, R. Dolzer, The Impact of InternationalInvestment Treaties on Domestic
Administrative Law, 37 INT'L L. & POL. 953, 953-54 (2005) (hereinafter Dolzer);
PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 240 ("The occasional costs of having offered international
protection of investors' rights appear minuscule compared to the macroeconomic effects

of the treaty overall"). For a useful discussion of this explanation for investment treaties
and possible implications of it being unsupported by compelling evidence, see J.W.
Salacuse, The Treatification of InternationalInvestment Law, 8 STUD. INT'L FIN. ECON. &

TECH. L. 241, 245 (2007) (hereinafter Salacuse); K.

J.

Vandevelde, A Brief History of

InternationalInvestmentAgreements, 12 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157 (2005).
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treaty, merely by setting up a holding company in that state. Likewise, an
investment that was originally domestic - in that it was owned by nationals of the
state in question - can be made "foreign" merely by a paper transfer of
ownership to a foreign entity.37 Most surprisingly (based on an expansive
jurisdictional ruling by two of the three arbitrators in Tokios38) a domestic
business can apparently make itself "foreign" so as to bring a claim against its
own country simply by creating a holding company in a state that is party to a
BIT with the home country.
There are various explanations and rationales for the strange decision of
states to allow this legal maneuvering and gaming by investors. Yet if the aim of
investment treaties is to encourageforegn investment between the states parties to
the treaty - and not to extend special legal rights and privileges broadly to an
international class of corporate owners of assets - then the expansive approach to
forum-shopping that is enabled by broad language in many of the treaties and, in
turn, by the permissive interpretations of some arbitrators makes no sense.
Indeed, it undermines the entire conceptual framework for the negotiation of
investment treaties whose purpose is simply to encourage investment flows
between the territories of the states parties to the treaty.
A second point that calls into question this justification is that few, if any,
investment treaties place enforceable obligations on the home states of investors
to encourage or facilitate outward investment by, for instance, liberalizing their
own regulatory regimes or enhancing their programs for investment insurance.
This is anomalous if the purpose of an investment treaty is indeed to encourage
capital flows between the states parties. Home states might, for instance, commit
to subsidizing regulatory risk insurance for investments that are covered by the
treaty. Further, they might require the use of that insurance to supplement the
compensatory regime of the treaty in cases where an investor has suffered losses
due to general regulatory activity by the host state. On this basis, the regulatory
risks that are inherent in foreign investment, and in all forms of business
decision-making in the face of changing social, economic, and environmental
conditions, would be shared between host and home state. Instead of obligating
home states to take such steps, investment treaties typically establish subrogation
rights of political risk insurance or guarantee programs in order to allow the
home country to step into the shoes of the investor in advancing a claim against
the host country.39 In this respect, the purpose appears to be more about
37 Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela (11 July, 1997), 5 ICSID REP. 186, 37 I.L.M.
1378.
38 Tokios Tokel~s v Ukraine (29 April, 2004), 20 ICSID REV. 205, 16(4) WORLD
TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 75 (hereinafter Tokios).
39 R. DOLZER & M. STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 156 (Kluwer Law
International 1995).
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protecting the economic position of home states where a dispute has arisen
between one of its nationals and another state than about encouraging investment
flows.
A third point concerning the texts of investment treaties is that most of them
apply to existing investments. However, if the purpose of the treaty is to attract
investment, why apply it to investments that have already been attracted? One
might expect that capital-importing states would prefer not to extend an
investment treaty to existing investments, limiting it instead to new investments
and to re-investments in the host economy by existing investors. Why would a
state make extensive legal concessions, and put the state treasury at significant
risk, in the case of investments already won?
Of course, various explanations could be offered. One is that the major
capital-exporters were aggressive in insisting that existing investments be
protected and that all (or virtually) capital-importing countries gave into this
pressure over the course of the hundreds of investment treaties now in force.
Another explanation is that capital-importers were driven by an ideological
commitment to openness and to the attraction of foreign capital, whether or not
the investments were already in place. Another is that these states were not well
informed about what they were negotiating and, as a result, made bad decisions. I
do not suggest that any of these explanations is particularly compelling. All or
none of them might play a role in the experiences of different countries and
treaties. But this and other features of the great majority of investment treaties
cast doubt on the explanation that states concluded such treaties so as to
encourage foreign investment.
Doubts about this justification for investment treaties are supported by the
fact that empirical research to date is at best mixed on the issue of whether the
treaties actually encourage investment. I have reviewed eight empirical studies on
the proposition that they do encourage investment, of which five found little or
no positive connection between the conclusion of investment treaties and an
increase in foreign direct investment. To summarize, in 1998, UNCTAD
concluded that BITs played a "minor and secondary role in influencing FDI
flows".40 In a comprehensive study, Hallward-Dreimeier analyzed FDI flows
from OECD to developing countries during 1980-2000 and found a "significant
negative finding on the impact of ratifying a BIT". 41 Tobin and Rose-Ackerman
40

UNCTAD,

Bilateral Investment

Treaties

in

the

Mid-1990s, UN

Doc.

UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998), at 141-2.
41 M. Hallward-Dreimeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foregn Direct
Investment? Only a Bit... and They Could Bite, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
3121 (2003), at 19.
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found that BITs have "little impact" on the attraction of FDI, although they may
have an impact in countries with higher political risks, and that "signing a BIT
with the United States does not correspond to increased FDI flows". 42 Salacuse
and Sullivan, in contrast, find a positive effect on FDI flows for U.S. BITs but
less so for BITs concluded by other OECD countries.43 Neumayer and Spess in a
2005 study found a positive and statistically significant effect of BITs on FDI
flows and that, the greater the number of BITs signed with capital-exporting
countries, the greater the amount of FDI, thus offering "the first hard evidence
that there is a payoff to a developing country's willingness to incur the costs of
negotiating BITs and to succumb to the restrictions on sovereignty".44 Yet,
applying Neumayer and Spess' model, Yackee found the relationship of BITs to
FDI flows to be marginal and much smaller than Neumayer and Spess suggested
and that their findings "rest on quite unstable ground" and "are far less robust"
than a casual reading of their study would suggest.45 Finally, in a recent qualitative
study, Poulsen used qualitative evidence based on interviews with political risk
46
insurers to supplement the quantitative studies to date and concluded that:
[...] [Quantitative and qualitative data currently available suggests that
while BITs undoubtedly play a role in some investment projects, they are
highly unlikely to be a determining factor for the vast majority of foreign
investors determining where, and how much, to invest.
Thus, there is, at best, conflicting evidence that investment treaties actually
encourage foreign investment (and in turn that any signalling effect of the treaties
has actual effects on investor decision-making about where to commit capital). As
4

2J. Tobin & S. Rose-Ackerman, Foreign DirectInvestment and the Business Environment in
Developing Countries: The Impact of BilateralInvestment Treaties, Center for Law, Economics and
Policy Research Paper No. 293, Yale Law School (2004) at 19, 22, 31. In a second study,
using new data, the authors concluded that the number of BITs that a country has signed
with a high income country affected positively the amount of FDI inflow, but that the

marginal benefit of an extra BIT to the host country declined as more and more countries
concluded investment treaties. J. Tobin & S. Rose-Ackerman, Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Do They Stimulate Foreign DirectInvestment?, available at: http//ssrn.com (2006) at 18-21.
43 J.W. Salacuse & N.P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67 (2005).
44 E. Neumayer & L. Spess, Do bilateralinvestment treaties increaseforegn direct investment to
at:
available
Online,
Research
LSE
at
5,
countries?,
developing
http://eprints.1se.ac.uk/archive/00000627.
45 J.W. Yackee, Sacrificing Sovereignty: Bilateral Investment Treaties, InternationalArbitration,
and the Quest for Capital, USC Center in Law, Economics and Organizational Research
Paper No. C06-15 (2006), at 51.
46 L.S. Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk
Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND POLICY 2009/2010 (K. Sauvant ed., forthcoming 2010).
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such, and in light of the risks assumed by states under the treaties, it is dubious,
not to say reckless, for anyone to assert today that the treaties are a vehicle to
encourage actual investments. Also, it is clear that in the 19 9 0 s - when so many
of the treaties were concluded - there was no empirical evidence that they served
this stated purpose. Most states therefore committed themselves to what are
arguably the most financially risk-laden international obligations in the world
today without a credible empirical basis for the claim that the treaties would
achieve their stated purpose.
In the 1990s, one could claim reasonably that a lack of evidence about the
benefits of investment treaties was matched by a lack of evidence about their
risks. There were only a handful of investment treaty awards against states prior
to the mid-1990s and there was arguably limited understanding of the scope of
the general and prospective consents of states to compulsory arbitration. 47 Since
the explosion of claims in the late 1990s, however, hundreds of additional treaties
have been concluded. Why would states continue to conclude (or decline to
withdraw from) a treaty model for which there was no evidence that they actually
encouraged investment, while carrying serious risks and liabilities for states? One
explanation is that the encouragement of investment is not a key consideration
for governments that have continued to conclude more and more treaties. If the
aim was to encourage investment, those states would presumably have taken
steps to enhance the role of the treaties in this respect. Alternatively, one may
conclude that it simply takes time for evolving knowledge and evidence about the
system to influence official decision-making.
Whatever the explanation, the key point is that this justification for the
system is contradicted by a number of common provisions in investment treaties
and unsupported by the preponderance of empirical evidence. If this justification
was a major factor in the decisions of many states to conclude investment treaties
- or of international organizations to promote the investment treaty model - then
these decisions appear to have been based on incomplete knowledge about the
expected linkages between the treaties and capital flows. Likewise, in the absence
of stronger evidence that the treaties actually encourage investment, a major
plank in the wider case for the treaties as contributors to sustainable development
and to social welfare falls away. 48

C. McLachlan, CommentaU: The Broader Context, 18 ARB. INT'L 339, 340 (2002).
J.E. Stiglitz, Mulinational Corporaions: Balandng Rights and Responsibiliies, 101 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 3, 4 (2007).
47
48
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Justification 2: Investment Treaties Respond to the Bias and Unreliability of Domestic
Courts

It is often pointed out by advocates for investment treaty arbitration that
domestic remedies in developing and transition states, and even in developed
states, are inadequate because they take much too long, are biased, are corrupt, or
are otherwise unreliable. 49 In its more aggressive form, this argument mutates into
a rejection of courts in general because the judicial process entails too careful and
time-consuming consideration of a dispute and too many opportunities for
appeal, to permit the desired speed and clarity in business decision-making. More
commonly, however, this justification is not framed so as to condemn all courts
as biased against foreign investors. It is said, rather, that the courts of some
countries are non-functional or biased or corrupt so as to make them unreliable,
and on this at least there can be little doubt (without going so far as to name
particular countries). Domestic legal systems may be inaccessible or take too long;
judges may be corrupt or otherwise incapable of ensuring fairness.
As a matter of principle, states should work to address this problem for all
investors, domestic or foreign, and indeed for all citizens. Those who promote
investment treaties as a response to the weaknesses of domestic legal systems,
therefore, might also be expected to champion provisions in investment treaties
that seek to address the unreliability of courts for investors and non-investors
alike. The treaties could, for example, allow citizens that have a grievance against
a foreign investor - due to major environmental damage or human rights abuse
that it has allegedly caused, for example5 o - to bring an international claim against
the investor where the domestic legal system does not offer them an expeditious
and fair process. Likewise, in the absence of broader access by non-investors to
the process of international adjudication of investment disputes, it might be
acknowledged that investment arbitration itself appears unfair. This is because
fairness usually calls for all parties that are affected by the resolution of a dispute
to be given standing in the adjudicative process and because, in investment treaty
arbitration, only one class of private interests - the investor - has the right to be
heard directly. Others affected by the conduct of the state or of the investor are
barred from party status and thus from the right to introduce evidence, make
submissions, and otherwise participate fully in the process.5' If domestic remedies
49 J. Paulsson, Enclaves of Justice, Presentation to the Rule of Law Conference,
University of Richmond School of Law (12 April, 2007); T.W. Wilde, The PresentState of

Research Camed Out ly the English-SpeakingSection of the Centrefor Studies and Research, in NEW

63, 77-78 (P. Kahn & T.W. W5lde eds.,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) (hereinafter WAlde).
50 Miles, supra note 2, at 4-5.

ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

J.

Alvarez, CriticalTheory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's ChapterEleven,
28 U. MIAI INTER-AM. L. REv. 303, 307-09 (1997).
51

34

Trade, Law and Development

[Vol.II: 19

are unreliable, then why allow investors alone to take part in the international
adjudicative process?
The response of the treaties to this rationale for the system is therefore underinclusive. It extends the benefits of international arbitration to a narrow class of
private actors, giving foreign investors the unique opportunity to resort to domestic
or international options (or both) as they prefer. Of course, not all foreign investors
are well positioned by the system to bring a claim against a state that has abused
them in some way.52 The cost of access, in particular, precludes many foreign
investors ever from bringing a claim. 5 3 On the other hand, there is a class of large
firms that have substantial wealth wrapped up abroad which can utilize the system
in a range of potent ways. Most problematically, when one considers the lack of
access by other interests in the process, large firms are uniquely positioned to use
the system in order to challenge state measures that are aimed generally at
advancing a development strategy, stabilizing the financial system, promoting
human rights, protecting public health and the environment, etc. 54
This raises a second difficulty with the present justification in light of the
system's design. The treaties are over-inclusive because they do not account for
situations in which domestic courts do offer justice to a foreign investor.55 By
removing the duty to exhaust local remedies unconditionally, many investment
treaties allow investors to turn their back entirely on domestic law or,5 6 indeed, to
game the system by bringing multiple claims under the treaty (or multiple
treaties5 and in domestic courts.58 The investor has the sole discretion, unlike in
other treaty regimes that allow individual claims, to decide on the reliability,
suitability, and so on of the alternative remedies. Combined with the permissive
52J.Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of IVTO Law
in Investor-StateArbitration:Competition and its
Discontents,20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 749, 758 (2009).
s3 Walde, supra note 49, at 87-88.
54 L.E. Peterson, The Global Governance of Foreign Direct Investment: Madly Off in All

Directions,Dialogue on Globalization Occasional Paper No. 19 (Geneva: Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, May 2005) at 17-21.
ss Republic of South Africa, Bilateral Investment Treaty Poliy Framework - Government

Position Paper(Pretoria: Department of Trade and Industry, June 2009), at 45 (hereinafter
Republic of South Africa).
56 In the absence of a fork-in-the-road clause applied robustly by the arbitration
tribunal (many tribunals have interpreted away such clauses where the domestic claims
were pursued by a different corporate entity from, although it was closely related to, the
company that brought the treaty claim).
57 Lauder (Ronald S) v Czech Republic (3 September, 2001), 4 WORLD TRADE &
ARB. MATERIAIS 35 (2002); CME Republic BV v Czech Republic (13 September, 2001),
14(3) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 109.
58 Infra note 107.
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approach to forum-shopping endorsed by most of the arbitration tribunals, this
allows much maneuvering by corporate lawyers to maximize the pressure on host
governments and thus enhance the prospect of public compensation for their
clients. This gives immense power to a class of large foreign investors that is
unavailable to other investors and, of course, to citizens and communities in
general.
Based on this justification for the system, then, one would expect a rational
connection between the treaty provisions and the purported rationale. If the
concern was that domestic courts systems in some countries are unreliable, then
the duty to exhaust local remedies should be removed selectively in such
circumstances. Or, at least, the treaties should allow a state to demonstrate based on a rigorous threshold - that its legal system does offer justice to a foreign
investor, as a basis for removing a tribunal's jurisdiction over the claim. Likewise,
the question of the reliability of the host country's courts should be decided by an
independent tribunal, and not by the foreign investor or the state.
Yet we do not see such provisions in the treaties. Instead, the duty to exhaust
local remedies is removed unconditionally, 59 even for countries that have mature
and advanced systems of justice; indeed, it is removed for systems that far surpass
investment arbitration itself for their institutionalized fairness, openness, and
independence. Also, the treaties remove the duty to exhaust local remedies in the
case of developing and transition states that do offer high standards of access to
justice or that have made major advances in this directicn. As a result, the treaties
do not leave space for recognition and acknowledgement of variations in the
quality of domestic legal systems.
C

Justification 3: Investment ArbitrationAdvances Fairness and the Rude of Iaw in the
Resolution ofInvestment Disputes

The next justification is connected to the criticism of domestic legal systems
that is implicit in the unconditional removal of the duty to exhaust local remedies,
as discussed above. It is the further claim that investment treaties have replaced
domestic law and courts with a fair, independent, and neutral process of
adjudication to resolve investor-state disputes and that the system advances the
61
rule of law.60 This is a dubious claim, as I have argued elsewhere, if we assume

59 Or with very limited conditions such as a 6-month duty of the investor to seek (but
without any duty to obtain) a friendly resolution of the dispute.
60 C.N. Brower & L.A. Steven, Who Then ShouldJudge? Developing the InternationalRule of
Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 195-97, 200-02 (2001) (hereinafter
Brower & Steven); S.D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the
Rule of Law, 19 GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 337, 340 (2007); Z. Douglas, Nothing if Not
CriticalforInvestment Treaty Arbitraion: Occidental,Eureko and Methanex, 22 ARB. INT'L 27, 27,
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that the rule of law rests on high standards of procedural fairness in adjudication
(and, as such, institutional safeguards of independence), especially at the final
level of adjudicative decision-making. The problem is that, on close scrutiny, the
system of investment treaty arbitration does not satisfy this requirement of the
rule of law.
The problem is unique to investment treaty arbitration because it is a form of
(formally non-reciprocal) public law adjudication and because investment treaty
arbitrators lack institutional safeguards of their independence, especially security
of tenure. This would not be a major issue if the matters decided by the
arbitrators were minor concerns or subject to thorough review by an independent
court. Neither is true however. Investment treaty arbitrators often resolve, on a
final basis, fundamental matters of public law without the prospect of close
scrutiny by independent judges, whether domestic or international. As a result,
longstanding safeguards of judicial independence in domestic systems of justice
have been abandoned in the unique context where foreign investors bring
international claims against states and, by extension, the people who are
represented by states.
Security of tenure is one of the core safeguards of adjudicative independence
in public law. 62 It is not an "artificial" attribute of judging (as was suggested to me
by one arbitrator at a conference in 200863); rather, in the Western liberal
tradition, it has for centuries been central to the notion of judicial independence
both from powerful private interests and from other branches of the state. It
emerged as a response to abuse of power by kings and queens and, as such, it
forms a part of the institutional apparatus that has limited and refined sovereign
power in the modern state. By removing it, as investment treaties clearly do,
states have returned us to a model of adjudicative decision-making that is directly
dependent on the discretion of executive officials in powerful governments and,
remarkably, in international business organizations and in the arbitration industry.
That is a strange way to promote the rule of law if this was indeed an aim of the
investment treaty system.
51 (2006); Dolzer, supra note 36, at 971-72; PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 265; Salacuse, supra
note 36, at 247; Walde, supra note 49, at 95, 101-02; I.A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets
Chicken i/ttle, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 229 (2001) (hereinafter Laird).
61 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, ProceduralFairness, and the Rule of Law, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (T. Walde & S.

Schill eds., Oxford University Press (forthcoming 2010).
62

Id.

This view was expressed by an arbitrator at the Harvard Law School conference,
The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (19 April, 2008). I have withheld the arbitrator's
name because it was not clear at the time whether the comment was meant for
attribution.
63
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Combined with other institutional safeguards of judicial independence including the state's provision of a set salary for the judge, bars on outside
remuneration, and an objective means of allocating adjudicators to specific cases
- security of tenure insulates judges from the appearance of inappropriate
pressure on their decision-making and, by extension, allows the courts to provide
a foundation for the rule of law. Without secure tenure for the judges who decide
public law, one must ask, where does the judge's career interest lay? Where one
can credibly show that the judges may be financially or economically beholden to
public or private interests that have a stake in the case or in the interpretation of
the law, then the appearance of independence - and appearances are key in this
respect given the difficulties of proving or disproving actual biaS64 - is seriously
undermined.
What is wrong with investment treaty arbitration in this respect? The first
problem is that the system is a one-way process of public law claims where only
one class of parties (the investors) triggers use of the system by bringing claims,
and only the other class (states) is liable to pay awards for violating the treaty.
Unlike in other situations where arbitration is used, the ability to bring claims is
non-reciprocal. Thus, arbitrators, especially those whose careers are intertwined
with the interests of the arbitration industry (in their classic 1996 study, Dezaley
and Garth called these arbitrators "specialist" or "technocrat" arbitrators), 65 are
reasonably seen to have an interest in encouraging claims and arbitrator
appointments, by interpreting the law in favour of prospective claimants.
However much it may be presented as a "court", arbitration is a private business
and (usually) a career path for those who are employed in the adjudication of
investment disputes.
To illustrate this concern, I note the following conclusions of Dezaley and
Garth, who drew on extensive interviews with arbitrators and lawyers in the field
of international commercial arbitration, on the arbitration industry: 66
The operation of the market in the selection of arbitrators... provides a key
to understanding the justice that emerges from the decisions of
arbitrators.67
The new generation of [arbitration] technocrats... emphasizes their ability
to satisfy the consumers in order to gain repeat business. 68
Seefor example, Locabail v Bayfield Properties, [2000] QB 451, 471-72.
Y. DEZALEY & B. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION & THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (University
of Chicago Press 1996) (hereinafter DEZALEY & GARTH).
6

65

66

67

Id.
Id., at 9.
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For the lawyers and their justice, the question is how to affirm the
autonomy necessary for legitimacy while at the same time manifesting
sufficient fidelity to the economic powers who must in the end find these
69
services worth purchasing and deploying.
It is good arbitration politics to thank business lawyers or other
acquaintances who bring nice arbitration matters by letting them have
limited access to the arbitration market. This system of exchange of favors
is essential to success in arbitration, a career dependent on personal
relations.7 0
The growth of the market in arbitrationis also evident in the competition
that can be seen among different national approaches and centres. 7 '
They [the newcomer arbitrators of the 1980s and 1990s] present
themselves... as international arbitration professionals, and also as
entrepreneurs selling their services to business practitioners... 72
The ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] has... become one of the
principal places where the "politics" of arbitration is elaborated and
expressed. There are innumerable committees and multiple networks of
influence that gravitate around this institution. The [ICC International
Court of Arbitration], for example, which is really an oversight committee
that reviews arbitration appointments and decisions, appears to be
particularly sensitive to the business clientele....
The multinational companies are in this way investing in the construction
of these legal services that serve them. 74
What these comments convey is that arbitrators operate in a marketplace and
that this appears likely to affect how they make decisions. Arbitrators supply
"symbolic capital" based on their reputations and thus have an interest to further
their position and that of the industry.75 The industry is made up of crossconnected players who affiliate around prominent centres of arbitration such as
the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. Arbitrators often name each
other for appointments and may exclude those who are not accepted within the
Id., at 194.
Id., at 70.
70 Id., at 124.
71 Id., at 7 (emphasis in original).
72
Id., at 36.
7 Id., at 45.
74 Id., at 93.
7 Id., at 8, 18.
68

69
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industry's networks. With the passing of the old generation of gentleman
arbitrators, according to Dezaley and Garth, the new technocrat arbitrators are
more intent on promoting the industry in competition with its alternatives (in the
present context, domestic courts and international diplomacy).76 Arbitrators,
unlike judges, can earn income from activities beyond their adjudicative role.7 7
Prominent figures in the industry often sit as arbitrators while advising and
representing claimants or respondents and while promoting arbitration clauses in
investment contracts, treaties, or arbitration rules.78
This provides a basis for reasonable suspicion of bias in the investment treaty
system. It raises precisely the sorts of concerns that institutional safeguards of
independence dispel by removing judges from the adjudicative marketplace and
positioning them instead within a public institution. It must be obvious to anyone
working in the industry, as to the informed outsider, that investment arbitration
cannot thrive unless international businesses consider it worthwhile to bring
claims and unless powerful states also see benefits in the system.79 Arbitrators will
no doubt vary in their level of commitment to values of fairness in adjudication
and in their sensitivity to the "economic powers" in investment arbitration. 80 But
anyone who seeks future or continued success as an arbitrator has reason to
promote the system among future claimants while defending it from possible
rejection by powerful states. Because this creates a credible appearance of bias in
the system, and because the issues at stake involve public law, investment treaty
arbitration is, in institutional terms, inconsistent with the rule of law.
The second issue, arising also from the lack of institutional safeguards of
independence in the system, involves the role of the organizations that are
designated as appointing authorities under investment treaties. These
organizations - of which ICSID is the most prominent - exercise fundamental
powers within the system. They appoint the presiding arbitrator in the absence of
agreement by the disputing parties or where a party (usually the state) has
declined to appoint its own arbitrator. They often play an active role in directing
the negotiations between the disputing parties on who to appoint by proposing a
Id., at 50.
n Id., at 49-50; J.A.F. Costa, American and European Investment Arbitrators: A Single
76

Culture?, Paper presented to Law and Society Association and the Canadian Law and
Society Association conference on Placing Law, Montreal (30 May, 2008) at 7-8.
78 N. Majeed, Investor-State Disputes and InternationalLIw: From the Far Side, 98 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 30, 31 (2004); DEZALEY & GARTH, supra note 65, at 8 (noting the

role of repeat players, especially large law firms, in the selection of arbitration institutions
and in the appointment of arbitrators).
7 W Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Lizgation to Arbitration, 55 INT'L
ORG. 919, 921-22 (2001).
8 DEZALEY & GARTH, supra note 65, at 70.
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list of prospective arbitrators which the authority would be inclined to select.
And, even when the appointing authority is not active in this respect, the residual
role of the appointing authority provides the backdrop for the parties' joint
decision on who to appoint. Further, if a party claims a conflict of interest on the
part of an arbitrator, then the claim is resolved by the appointing authority.
Finally, appointing authorities may exercise key supervisory powers over the
arbitration rules and over awards issued in particular cases. In the case of ICSID,
awards are subject to annulment proceedings before an annulment tribunal, all
three members of which are appointed by the President of the World Bank.81
The key problem here is that executive officials, however proficient and
neutral they may be at an individual level, have key discretionary powers over
critical steps in the adjudicative process. Institutional safeguards that would serve
to address the concerns arising from this executive control of the process (i.e.
safeguards such as an objective method of assignment of judges to cases and the
resolution of conflict of interest against a judge by an independent adjudicative
process) are absent. Thus, one may ask, for instance, whether the appointing
authority is sufficiently impartial and independent and whether its power
structure reflects a balance between the interests of capital-exporting and capitalimporting countries. As it stands, virtually all of the organizations that act as
appointing authorities under the treaties have a decided slant in favour of the
interests of capital-exporting stateS82 or international business. 83 This supports a
perception that the interests of a powerful state or a multinational firm, where
81 ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 52(3). See generally, ICSID Convention,
arts. 38, 52(3), and 58; Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, U.N. G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17,
U.N. Doc. A/3117, c V, s C (1976), arts. 6(2), -6(3), 7(2)-7(3), 12 (hereinafter
UNCITRAL. Rules); Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,
revised 1 January, 1998, arts. 8 and 11(3) (hereinafter ICC Rules).
82 E.g. under the ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 38, the President of the
World Bank exercises the power to appoint. This is an official who is customarily a
nominee of the U.S. Administration and who is in turn approved by other major states on
the World Bank's Board of Directors. Likewise, whereas some investment treaties allocate
this power instead to the Secretary General of ICSID, this is an official who is appointed
by a vote of the states parties to the ICSID Convention based on a nomination by the
World Bank President.
83 E.g. under investment treaties that designate the International Chamber of
Commerce as appointing authority by allowing investors to bring claims under the ICC
Rules. At the International Chamber of Commerce, this power is exercised by its
International Court of Arbitration. Under the ICC Rules, arbitrators are appointed by the
ICC's International Court of Arbitration, the members of which are chosen by the ICC
world council of business on the recommendation of the ICC Executive Board. ICC
Rules, supra note 81, arts. 1, 9(3)), and app I (Statute of the International Court of
Arbitration of the ICC, art 3).
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implicated by the relevant dispute, have influenced the appointing authority in the
exercise of its powers. Put differently, it creates a perception of bias within the
system that favours the position of prospective claimants, of powerful states that
hold power in the appointing authorities, and of private interests in the
arbitration industry.
This structure may be an intended outcome on the part of the major states
that originally designed investment treaties and thus the system. It is also
presumably a desirable aspect of the present system for entities like the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which has pushed successfully for a
regime that is highly favourable to its members and that happens also to provide
new market opportunities for ICC arbitrators. Even so, such a structure is not
defensible on grounds of procedural fairness and judicial independence. If the
aim were to advance these values, a more obvious choice would be the use of an
international body that incorporated safeguards of judicial independence to
decide investor-state disputes. So long as such a body was characterized by the
relevant safeguards, this would offer a credible case for the present justification of
the system. Absent serious consideration of this option by major states, and
considering the defensive reactions of some in the arbitration industry to the idea,
one has reason to question this justification for the system.
D. Justification 4: Investment Treaties Affirm the Soveregnty and BargainingStrategies of
States

Investment treaties have been criticized on the grounds that many states
allegedly did not appreciate the risks and obligations they were undertaking when
they joined the system in the 1990s. This has been met with approbation by some
advocates of the system, who say this criticism is patronizing towards developing
and transition countries. One senior arbitrator, in a statement to the email listserv
OGEMIDM, characterized this criticism as a "shopworn and offensive canard
that capital-importing countries cannot evaluate texts pressed upon them by
foreigners". 85
No doubt the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes of the country
that could not evaluate the treaties and the country that anticipated all their
implications. That is, we may presume that states had something between zero
8 Oil Gas Energy Mining Infrastructure And Investment Disputes, a commercial
listserve and discussion forum on international dispute management (hereinafter
OGEMID). My understanding is that OGEMID operates under Chatham House rules
whereby the infornation and opinions expressed may be cited, but based on anonymity
for the source. I am tempted in the interests of open debate not to respect this rule for
OGEMID, but shall err on the side of prudence.
85 OGEMID contribution of 10 April, 2007.
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and perfect information when they concluded the treaties that brought them into
the system. It is perhaps more fruitful to ask whether states in general, especially
in the 1990s, tended to have a sophisticated or unsophisticated understanding of
the new regime. Examining the treaty texts and, more broadly, the political
context for NAFTA, 86 I tend to see more evidence for the latter position than the
former. As such, I suggest here that governments in capital-importing and capitalexporting states alike may not have appreciated the consequences of the treaties
and, especially, the investor-state arbitration mechanism for competing principles
of legislative supremacy, governmental flexibility, and judicial independence, in
particular.
1. Did States Carry Out a Sophisticated Cost-Benefit Analysis?
Let us begin with the notion that most states had a sophisticated
understanding of the treaties when they entered the system. This view operates
from a position of trust in the commitment and capacity of public officials to
make good decisions on behalf of their people. It reflects an ideal that no
government can attain perfectly, but to which all should of course aspire.
Incidentally, in this respect, this view is somewhat in conflict with the
assumptions that underlie justification 3 for the system regarding the reliability of
domestic legal systems, as invoked by advocates of the system. But it is
nonetheless laudatory to expect that public officials would not change
dramatically their policies on investment and on international arbitration, via
investment treaties, without careful consideration of the implications. This
assumption is supported also by the decisions of many states - notably,
Argentina, which has faced a flood of claims for immense sums - to maintain
their treaty networks in the face of clear evidence of the risks and liabilities.
Also consistent with this perspective is the more pragmatic claim that, in
concluding investment treaties, states made careful bargaining choices to
relinquish their rights under customary international law in exchange for
substantial benefits. In examining this proposition we may ask, did this bargaining
choice reflect a careful weighing of costs and benefits based on a sound
understanding of the treaties? In terms of the benefits, as discussed above in
relation to Justification 187, it is highly questionable to claim that states were well
informed about the likelihood that investment treaties would encourage actual
investment. If it is true, as much of the empirical work suggests, that the treaties
have done little to attract investment, then states opted to constrain their policy
options and transfer major powers to foreign investors and to arbitrators without

6
8

J.R. MACARTHUR,
Supra. note 39,40.

THE SELLING OF "FREE TRADE"

(Hill and Wang 2000).
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receiving in exchange any measurable benefit in terms of actual investment. For a
start, this does not seem like a good bargain.
Moreover, and quite remarkably, many of the treaties are non-reciprocal not
only in effect (in that capital flows between the states parties are predominantly
one-way such that the capital-importing country assumes most of the actual
88
liabilities created by the treaty) but also in law. This is because the obligations
assumed by the states parties under some of the treaties are explicitly unequal. In
89
my own review of BITs over the past five years, I have always found that such
inequality operated in favour of a major capital-exporting party and at the
expense of a developing or transition state. The inequality is especially prominent
90
in the exceptions that are incorporated by the U.S. or Canada to their treaty
obligations to provide national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN)
treatment, especially at the pre-establishment stage. (Because of the significance
of the commitment to pre-establishment national or MFN treatment, states often
incorporate wide-ranging exceptions to these obligations.)
For instance, in a review of the four BITs concluded between the U.S. or
Canada and an Andean Community state, it emerged that the scope and content
9
of these exceptions were unequal. ' For example, in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, the
U.S. reserved a long list of sectors and activities from its pre-establishment
obligations:
-

Air transportation

88 E. Neumayer, Self interest,foreign need and good governance: are bilateralinvestment treaty
programs similar to aid allocation?, at 10-11, LSE Research Online (2006), available at:
8
http://eprints.1se.ac.uk/archive/0000080 .
89 Which has not been a systematic empirical review, but rather a series of periodic
studies of a total of several hundred treaties selected on an eclectic basis over the course
of different projects.
90 European states do not commit to either national treatment or MFN treatment at
the pre-establishment stage in their investment treaties and so have no need to include the
same exceptions.
91 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (Washington, 27
August, 1993; entered into force 11 May, 1997); Agreement between the Government of
Canada and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Quito, 29 April, 1996; entered into force 6 June,
1997); Treaty between the Government of the United States and the Government of the
Republic of Bolivia concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment (Santiago, 17 April, 1998; entered into force 6 June, 2001); Agreement
Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments (14 November, 2006; entered into force 20 June, 2007).
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Banking
Customhouse brokers
Government grants

-

Government insurance and loan programs

-

Energy and power production
Insurance

-

Maritime services and maritime-related services
Mining on the public domain

-

-
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Ocean and coastal shipping
Ownership of real property

Ownership and operation of common carrier radio and television
stations
Ownership of shares in the Communications Satellite Corporation
Primary dealership in United States government securities
Provision of common carrier telephone and telegraph services
Provision of submarine cable services
Use of land and natural resources

In comparison, Ecuador reserved very few sectors and activities:
-

Traditional fishing (not including fish processing or aquaculture)
Ownership and operation of broadcast radio and television stations

Thus, the U.S.-Ecuador BIT is unequal in terms of the scope of preestablishment obligations that are assumed by the states parties. The U.S. has
reserved for itself the right to maintain foreign admission and ownership
restrictions, thus allowing it to maintain national control of strategic sectors and
to preference domestic capital. U.S. banks, for example, are protected from
competition in their home markets from Ecuadorian banks, but have the right to
establish themselves and compete in Ecuador. 92 Ecuador, on the other hand, has
relinquished its right to limit and screen foreign investment such that it must
open its economy to foreign entry and ownership.
This inequality under investment treaties is present, to varying degrees, in all
four BITs concluded by the U.S. or Canada with an Andean Community
country.93 In each case, the developing state is given much less policy space to
Of course, it is unlikely that Ecuador would have a sufficient base of capital to
generate domestic investors that could in turn acquire ownership and control in strategic
sectors in the U.S. That said, by forum-shopping, a holding company in Ecuador could be
used as a vehicle for foreign capital from elsewhere to enter the U.S. economy.
93 Supra note 91.
92
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screen or condition foreign investment or to preference domestic firms.94 This is
counter-intuitive from a development perspective, in that major capital-exporting
states have reserved the ability to protect their economies and pursue a national
industrial policy while their developing country counterpart, presumably without
a strong base of domestic firms that can compete at the international level, must
allow foreign capital to flood virtually all sectors of the local economy.
Of course, states might have decided to conclude investment treaties however unequal in fact or in law - because they perceived other benefits of
doing so (or other risks of not doing so). For one, as discussed, they may have
believed it self-evident that the treaties would increase actual investment flows
from the opposite state party. Or they may have wished to avoid punitive
responses or recriminations by powerful states. Put differently, we might simply
acknowledge that the bargaining choices of states are made in a political context
that goes beyond consideration of markets and the movement of capital flows or
in themselves. At a certain point, though, the treaties become less a bargain and
more simply a capitulation by the weak to the powerful, without material
consideration in exchange for an offer to open the host economy to foreign
ownership.' 5 The treaties, that is, offer evidence that undermines the present
justification of the system. Just as the unequal treaties of earlier periods were
condemned on normative grounds,' 6 so too can investment treaties be criticized
for a lack of reciprocity in the benefits they bestow.
2.

Did Developing and Transition States Appreciate the Risks?

This leads to the related question of whether states that have entered into
investment treaties fully appreciated the risks of those treaties when they were
concluded. Let us begin with developing and transition states. Does it appear that
they committed the necessary resources and expertise in their governments to
analyze the treaties in order to make careful decisions to conclude them? We have
indications that they did not. There are reports of investment treaties being
signed as photo opportunities at road shows by public officials.' 7 Pakistan's
94 On the other hand, even in the case of the U.S. and Canada, significant gaps are
apparent where sectoral exceptions included in one BIT are omitted from another BIT,
particularly where the latter allows forum-shopping.
95 Republic of South Africa, supra note 55.
96 M.R. AUSLIN, NEGOTIATING WITH IMPERIALISM: THE UNEQUAL TREATIES AND
THE CULTURE OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY (Harvard University Press 2004); D. WANG,
CHINA'S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY (Lexington Books
2005).
97 See, for example, L. Poulsen and D. Vis-Dunbar, Reflecions on Pakistan's investmenttreaty program after 50 years; an interview with the formerAttorney General of Pakistan, Makbdoom
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former Attorney General, Makhdoom Ali Khan, has reported that there was little
evidence in the early 2000s, when his country faced its first BIT claim, that
ministries in the Pakistani government (beyond the one that had signed them)
were aware of the country's BITs and that he was unable to uncover any records
9
demonstrating meaningful participation by Pakistan in the BIT negotiations. 8
Since his term as Attorney General ended in 2007, he reported, Pakistan has
continued to conclude BITs without analysis of the risks and without proper
government resourcing. Similarly, a South African government commission
reported recently that:99
Prior to 1994, the RSA [Republic of South Africa] had no history of
negotiating BITs and the risks posed by such treaties were not fully
appreciated at that time. The Executive had not been fully apprised of all
the possible consequences of BITs. While it was understood that the
democratically elected government of the time had to demonstrate that the
RSA was an investment friendly destination, the impact of BITs on future
policies was not critically evaluated. As a result the Executive entered into
agreements that were heavily stacked in favour of investors without the
necessary safeguards to preserve flexibility in a number of critical policy
areas. In reviewing the travaux preparatoires of the various BITs entered
into at the time, it became apparent that the inexperience of negotiators at
that time and the lack of knowledge about investment law in general
resulted in agreements that were not in the long term interest of the RSA.
These are serious, and indeed extraordinary, admissions for a government to
make. Of course, two examples do not make a pattern. On the other hand, if we
expect that officials and governments generally prefer not to admit mistakes specifically that they were not well informed when they made an important and
long-lasting policy decision - then it is reasonable to conclude that others were in
a similar situation to that of Pakistan and South Africa at the operative periods. 100

Ali Khan,

INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (16 March, 2009) (hereinafter Poulsen & VisDunbar).
98 Id.
9 Republic of South Africa, supra note 55.
100 One story relayed to me by a prominent counsel and arbitrator was that, when
representing a developing state in response to the first investment treaty claim against it,
he learned that the country in question, when it received the claim, was unable to find a
copy of the treaty and so had to ask for one from the counsel for the claimants. That a
government would have to resort to this embarrassing step suggests that it lacked even a
basic awareness of the risks associated with the investment treaty regime.
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The Role of Key Actors in Promoting the System

Besides the role of states themselves, further study is warranted on the role
played by actors in the arbitration industry in the promotion of the system. There
are a number of prominent individuals who work as counsel or as arbitrators in
the system, who appear to have had a role in the negotiation of the treaties, and
who are strong advocates for the system. Typically they are based in large
international law firms although they may move in and out of government
positions as well. Two persons who appear to have played a role in this respect
are Jan Paulsson and Daniel M. Price.
Paulsson is a prominent figure in arbitration, especially in Europe. As of
December 2009 he was co-head of the arbitration and public international law
departments at Freshfields LLP in Paris.' 0 He was also president of the London
Court of International Arbitration and the World Bank Administrative Tribunal.
In 1996, Dezaley and Garth described Paulsson as "one of the leading Paris
members of the new generation" of professional arbitration specialists and as
having "excellent connections to the major institutions and journals, a strong base
in practice as arbitrator and lawyer, and the capital that comes from major
publications".102 Paulsson holds several academics tides, including chairs at the
Universities of Dundee and Miami and a visiting professorship at the London
School of Economics and Political Science. He got his start in international
arbitration in 1975 as a new associate at the New York-based law firm Coudert
Brothers, working on one of the Libyan oil nationalization cases.103
Paulsson is a prominent actor in the field of commercial and investment
arbitration. He has served as counsel or as an arbitrator in at least 13 investment
arbitrations, including six as the presiding arbitrator, six as the investor-appointed
arbitrator, and one as the state-appointed arbitrator. 104 In the early 1990s,
Paulsson advised Mexico on the negotiation of NAFTA Chapter 11 and he has
taken responsibility for conceiving and drafting its mechanism on the
consolidation of investor claims (NAFTA Article 1126).105 He has not moved in
and out of government positions although he does appear on behalf of
101 Freshfields,

People: Jan Paulsson, available at: www.freshfields.com/people/

profile/11/2654 (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
102 DEZALEY & GARTH, supra note 65, at 140 and 24, respectively.
103

Id., at 24.

This is based on my own collected data which is limited due to its reliance on
publicly reported information and the continuing confidentiality in many investment
arbitration cases on key facts, such as who has been appointed to the tribunal or even fact
that a claim exists. See also supra note 22.
105 J. Paulsson, Arbitration Without Pricity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT
104

L.J. 232, 248 (1995) (hereinafter Paulsson-ArbitrationWithoutPriity).
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government at official meetings, as when he reportedly represented first the
London Court of International Arbitration and then Bahrain in recent
UNCITRAL meetings on the revision of its arbitration rules.106 Paulsson is also
one of Bahrain's appointees to the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators.107
An element of Paulsson's prominence in the industry is his strong promotion
of the investment treaty system. I shall review, in some detail, some of the
advocacy positions that he has adopted in this respect, both in arbitration awards
and in published statements. These are intended as examples and I do not claim
to provide a fulsome sample in this respect. I should also note that Paulsson, as
an arbitrator, has been party to decisions that were decided against the investor
interest and in favour of states. 08 Based on the available record of awards by
tribunals on which he has sat, Paulsson does not appear to be a strongly proinvestor (or pro-state) arbitrator relative to others who are appointed frequently
under investment treaties. That said, Paulsson has participated in tribunals that
interpreted investment treaties in ways that significantly expanded the scope of
the system and its compensatory promise for investors.
For instance, Paulsson was the presiding arbitrator on the GAMI tribunal,
which took the unusual step of rejecting the submissions of both the investor's
home state (the U.S.) and the host state (Mexico) in that case on how to resolve
an issue of NAFTA interpretation involving claims by minority shareholders. 09
Both the U.S. and Mexico submitted that a NAFTA claim by a U.S. company that
was a minority shareholder in a Mexican company - which had allegedly been
expropriated by Mexico - could be advanced under NAFTA only in relation to
injuries to the minority shareholder itself and not for injuries to the domestic
company. This was an important distinction to draw because allowing a minority
shareholder to step into the shoes of a domestic company would facilitate parallel
claims under NAFTA and domestic law and thus expand opportunities for
gaming by investors of the NAFTA arbitration mechanism. The GAMI tribunal,
on which Paulsson was the presiding arbitrator, rejected these submissions of the
two states parties, in favour of those of the investor, thus expanding significantly
the jurisdiction of arbitrators under NAFTA Chapter 11.

'o6 Email to the Author from an individual who attended the relevant UNCITRAL
meetings, dated 28 December, 2009 (on file with author).

107 ICSID, Members of the Panels of Coniliatorsand ofArbitrators (October 2009) at 11.
108 See, for example, Azinian (Robert) et al v United Mexican States (1 November,

1999), 14 ICSID REV. 538, 39 I.L.M. 537, 5 ICSID REP. 272,
83, 87.
1' GAMI Investments, Inc v Government of the United Mexican States (15
November, 2004), 44 I.L.M. 545, 17(2) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 127.
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In his published work as well, Paulsson has advocated for interpretations of
investment treaties that favoured claimants and has criticized others that limited
the risks of the system for states (although Paulsson has also cautioned arbitrators
not to go too far in favour of investors lest states "take fright" and withdraw
from the system"10). For example, Paulsson commented

that he found it

"astonishing" that the Loewen tribunal - in the face of silence on the point in
NAFTA - would decide that the duty to exhaust local remedies was not removed
by NAFTA in the case of a claim that the U.S. violated NAFTA's minimum
standard of treatment following a decision of one of its domestic courts."' In
Paulsson's words, this was tantamount to reading a requirement to exhaust local
remedies "as an implied condition" of investor claims under NAFTA.11 2 To be
clear, Paulsson's position on this point is not without foundation, given the
ambiguity of the NAFTA text. The point here is simply that Paulsson saw fit to
criticize openly another NAFTA tribunal and to favour, from a position of
prominence in the arbitration industry, the resolution of the issue in favour of
claimants and in favour of an expansive approach to the system.
Paulsson has also spoken strongly against those who criticize the use of
investment treaty arbitration on grounds that it restricts democratic choice,
unduly dismisses the role of the domestic legal system, or undermines important
values such as judicial independence. For instance, in his book, Paulsson
lambasted critics in the U.S. Congress, media, and non-governmental
organizations who criticized NAFTA Chapter 11 and the power it gives to large
companies and to arbitrators. Paulsson commented:" 3
The neonationalist currents seem most persuasive to those who are
attracted by sensationalist allegations of conspiracies against the public
interest, and are disinclined to make an effort to grasp the more complex
themes of international rules and economic cooperation. The shrill voices
will always be with us. They are an inevitable part of democratic debate. It
would be our loss if they fell silent; they provide valuable occasions to
articulate rational rebuttals of the extreme positions which underlie appeals
to public prejudice.
This was an aggressive advocacy position in defense of investment treaty
arbitration. While calling for rational rebuttal of the system's critics, Paulsson's
own response to critics of NAFTA Chapter 11 (over the course of two pages in
the book) was to refer to them "shrill", "neonationalist", sensationalist, attracted
to "conspiracies", lacking in "political maturity", "true believers", "[s]ervants of
10 Paulsson-ArbitradionWitbout Pritiy,sApra note 105, at 257.
u1 Paulsson-ArbitraionWithoutPriity,supra note 105, at 240.
112

In

113 PAUISSON, supra note

,
3, at 231-2.
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their revelation", and propagandists "who care little about the means of
advancing their cause".11 4 To be fair, Paulsson also laid out various reasoned
replies. But it is indicative of his advocacy for the system that he adopted such
strong language in responding to criticisms of investor-state arbitration under
NAFTA Chapter 11.
Another prominent advocate for investment arbitration whose role I will
outline briefly is Daniel M. Price. Price is a Washington-based lawyer and
arbitrator who has held official positions in the U.S. government. As of
December 2009, Price was senior partner for global issues at Sidney Austin LLP,
an international law firm, where he "represents clients on a range of international
regulatory, transactional and policy matters" while also representing clients "in
the resolution of international disputes"." 5 In the Administration of George W.
Bush, Price held the positions of Assistant to the President and Deputy National
Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs, where he was the senior
White House official responsible for international economic issues, including
international investment. He was President Bush's personal representative to the
G-8, G-20 Financial Summit, and APEC Forum. Earlier in his career, Price was
the U.S. Trade Representative's lead negotiator on investment in the NAFTA
negotiations and was a legal advisor on negotiations toward a Uruguay Round
investment agreement. During 1989-2002, he was Principal Deputy General
Counsel of the U.S. Trade Representative, where he negotiated investment
treaties with Eastern European and Latin American states. He appears to have
gotten his start in the general field of investment arbitration in 1984-86, when he
represented the U.S. government and advised U.S. businesses in arbitrations
before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. More recently, Price served as counsel to
investors in investment arbitrations against Argentina, India, Mexico, Pakistan
and Poland, and as counsel to the governments of Turkey and Peru in such
arbitrations." 6
Price also works as an arbitrator in the system. He was (or is) an arbitrator in
at least five cases under investment treaties. It is probable in light of his
background that Price was appointed in all of these cases by the claimant
(investor), although this cannot be verified in all cases due to the lack of openness7
in UNCITRAL arbitrations involving the Permanent Court of Arbitration."
114
115

Id., at 232-3.
Sidley Austin, Our People: DanielM. Price, available at: www.sidley.com/ourpeople/

detail.aspx?FullBio=true&attorney=357 (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
116

Id

In both cases where the information is publicly available, Tokios, supra note 38,
and Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL,
(Sep. 7, 2006), Price was appointed by the claimant.
117
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Because ICSID arbitrations are more open, however, we know that Price was the
investor's appointee to the Tokios tribunal, which produced a highly pro-investor
jurisdictional decision that allowed a group of Ukrainians to bring a claim against
their own government (under the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT) by way of a holding
company in Lithuania." 8 (In opposition to this pro-investor interpretation, the
presiding arbitrator on the tribunal, Prosper Weil, dissented and then resigned
from the tribunal). The decision of the majority of the Tokios tribunal remains
controversial because of the extent to which it expanded the scope of the system
in the face of ambiguity in the relevant BIT and the ICSID Convention.
Of course, actors like Price and Paulsson are not themselves responsible for
the system; it is governments that concluded the treaties. But, to understand the
decision-making of states, an inquiry is also warranted into how actors in the
arbitration industry may have affected the conclusion as well as the interpretation
of investment treaties. The same goes for organizations beyond national
governments that have encouraged the conclusion of investment treaties. Not
surprisingly, business organizations have championed the system in its muscular
form and have reacted defensively to proposals for reform." 9 It is also notable
that the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce was given the role of
appointing authority mainly in investment treaties of Western European (and not
North American) capital-exporters. Considering that the ICC is itself a business
organization, it is important to take into account its role both as advocate for the
system on behalf of business and supplier of arbitration services, on the one
hand, and as an official appointing authority under investment treaties, on the
other. Finally, international organizations - such as UNCTAD's Division on
Investment, Technology, and Enterprise Development through its work
programme on investment treaties120 - have played an important role in
promoting and facilitating the conclusion of investment treaties.121 From the late
118 Tokios, supra note 38.

19 Most recently, in the review of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: U.S.
Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy, Report of the Adisog Committee on
InternationalEconomic Po~g Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Presented to: The
Department ofState (30 September, 2009), Annex B, 18-27 and 30-1.
120 P.T. Muchlinski, Attempts to Extend the Accountability of TransnadonalCorporations:The
Role of UNCTAD, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-105 (M. T. Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi eds., Kluwer Law

International 2000) (hereinafter Muchlinski).
121 Besides UNCTAD's numerous publications on the topic, see e.g. World Bank,
World Development Report 2005 - A Better Investment Climatefor Eveyone (New York: IBRD/

Oxford University Press 2004), which discusses the role of investment treaties in reducing
barriers to international investment and in contributing to investment climate
improvements without mentioning the risks posed by investment treaty arbitration to
states.
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1990s, UNCTAD has organized "capacity-building seminars, regional symposia,
training courses, dialogues between negotiators and groups of civil society on the
subject".122 Investment treaties were also reportedly signed en masse at UNCTAD
meetings organized for developing states.123 Since the late 1990s, UNCTAD has
published an extensive working paper series that tended to neglect or under-state
the risk of investor claims and the implications for policy space.124
4.

Did Capital-Exporting States Appreciate the Risks?

What about the major capital-exporting states? To what extent did they
understand the risks as well as the benefits of the expansion of their treaty
networks? One may assume that there were at least groups of officials in Western
Europe and North America (where the treaties were devised from the 1960s
through the 1980s) who understood clearly what they were negotiating. Officials
in the UK, for example, must have had a sophisticated understanding of MFN
treatment when they incorporated express language into some UK BITs1 25 that
extended MFN treatment from substantive to procedural aspects of other BITs,
given that this language anticipated the complex questions of interpretation that
were famously resolved in favour of claimants in Maffezjniu-6 and (especially)
Siemens.127 We may also assume that UK officials realized the significance of
provisions in the UK-Egypt BIT that allow for forum-shopping by investors
against Egypt but that shield the UK from reciprocal forum-shopping by

122 R. Ricupero, "Preface" [dated December 1998] in UNCTAD, "Admission and
Establishment", UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements
(2002). Muchlinski, supra note 123, at 113.
123 Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 28, at 818-19.
124 1 Was informed by a former UN official that the UNCTAD's Division on
Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development held views on FDI that were "in
marked contrast to the rest of UNCTAD". Email to the author (6 December, 2009). On

the closing of space for development policies, see UN Development Programme, Human
Development Report 2005 (New York: UNDP, 2005), at 133-9.
125 E.g. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Barbados for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments with Protocol (Bridgetown, 7 April, 1993; U.K.T.S. No. 54
(1993); entered into force 7 April. 1993), art. 3(3) (hereinafter the UK-Barbados BIT);
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Chile for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments with Protocol (Santiago, 8 January, 1996; U,KT,S, No, 37

(1997); entered into force 21 April, 1997), art. 3(4) (hereinafter the UK-Chile BI).
126 Maffezini (Emilio Agustin) v. Kingdom of Spain (25 January, 2000), 16 ICSID
REv. 212, 124 ILR 9.
127

Siemens AG v Argentine Republic (3 August, 2004), 44 I.L.M. 138.
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requiring Egyptian investors to have their corporate seat in Egypt.128 In both
respects, UK officials were capable of careful refinement of their treaties to
enhance the protection of UK investors or to insulate the UK from certain types
of claims (although neither of these provisions, especially the latter, is reflected in
all of the UK's BITs). On the other hand, it may be that a sophisticated
understanding on the part of some officials in the UK or the other capitalexporting states that negotiated the treaties was not shared by officials elsewhere
in government, especially those responsible for the regulatory activities that
impact on investors.
If any governments understood the risks posed by investment treaties to
policy space and to principles of democratic choice or judicial independence, one
may assume it was the governments of major states which have the expertise and
resources to conduct careful analysis when designing and negotiating their
treaties. In the case of NAFTA, this assumption -is open to question. The
experience of NAFTA Chapter 11 from the mid-1 990s, when companies began
to bring claims against the U.S. and Canada, indicated that key decision-makers in
those countries had little understanding of the implications of investor-state
arbitration or of the important powers it assigned to arbitrators.129 After seeing
the arbitration mechanism in operation, the NAFTA states took the significant
step - in the face of opposition by many in the arbitration industry130 - of
requiring openness in the arbitration process and of clipping the discretion of
Chapter 11 arbitrators after tribunals had interpreted NAFTA in ways that went
well beyond the submissions of the NAFTA states. (It remains to be seen
whether a similar reaction will emerge in the major Western European capitalexporters if and when their governments become the subject of substantial
investor claims.' 31) If the U.S. and Canada were caught off guard by aspects of

128 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments (London, 11 June, 1975; U.K.T.S. No. 97
(1976); entered into force 24 February, 1976), art. 1(d)(ii) (hereinafter the UK-Egypt BIT).
129 Former U.S. Congressman Abner Mikva and a member of the Loewen tribunal under
NAFTA said of NAFTA investor-state arbitration: "If Congress had known that there
was anything like this in NAFTA, they would never have voted for it". A. Liptak, Nafta
Tribunals Stir U.S. Worries, N.Y. TIMES, 18 April, 2004.

See, for example, T. Weler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of
International Economic Law, 36 CAN. BUS. L.J. 405, 422-30 (2002); C.N. Brower, C.H.
Brower II & J.K. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the GlobalAdjudication System, 19 ARB. INT'L
415, 434-35 (2003).
130

131 See the recent claim against Germany by a Swedish energy company in response
to environmental restrictions on a coal-fired power plant in Hamburg. S. Knauer,

Vattenfall vs. Germany: Power Plant Battle Goes to InternationalArbitration, Spiegel Online (15
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NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration,'132 where it was included as part of a trade

agreement that was debated extensively in both countries,' 33 then how likely is it
that governments with fewer resources were able to develop a sophisticated
understanding of the risks of investment treaties that received little or no public
attention when they were concluded?l 34
For these reasons, on balance there is reason to doubt that governments,
beyond the groups of officials who negotiated the treaties, tested the anticipated
benefits of the treaties, appreciated the risks of investor-state arbitration, and
carried out sophisticated cost-benefit analyses of their commitments to
compulsory international arbitration before committing themselves to the treaty
system. This is significant if one considers the degree to which the system marks
a major transformation of longstanding policies of governments on the national
and international legal framework for self-determination. Undoubtedly, more
systematic empirical work would be required to reach confident conclusions on
the historical situation of particular countries and particular treaties. Even so,
there is significant evidence against the claim that the investment treaty system
reflects a process of informed sovereign consent and thoughtful strategy on the
part of states.
E. Justification5: Investment Treaties Were Endorsed by the DemocraticProcess

In some respects, the fifth justification for the system is a softer version of
the claim that states were well-informed when they concluded their key
investment treaties. It is softer in that it asserts that, even if top-level decisionmakers in national executives and legislatures were not well-informed about the
consequences of the treaties and of their consents to investment arbitration, the
decisions to conclude the treaties was nevertheless understood to be consistent
with a wider neo-liberal policy 35 of the state and of the electorate. The objective
was to withdraw government from the economy and to open the economy to
foreign capital; investment treaties were a tool to do SO.1 36 Elections were held
and duly elected governments concluded the treaties. Opportunities were
afforded for debate; dissenting views were voiced and heard. In the end, the
relevant entities of the state choose to reform their economies and, as a
July, 2009), available at: www.spiegel.de/international/
germany/0,1518,druck636334,00.html.
132 Brower & Steven, supra note 60, at 194-5; Laird, supra note 60, at 224-5.
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PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 237-8.

Poulsen & Vis-Dunbar, supra note 97.
135 SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 18, at 2.
136 The role of BITs in the privatization

program adopted in Argentina in the early

1990s is a good example. Collinson, supra note 29, at 13.
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component of this, to join the international investment regime. Whether
governments foresaw all of the consequences is not the test; the test is whether
they consented according to the requirements of domestic law. Normatively, the
treaties capture an ideological spirit of a time. Formally, they were signed and
ratified and should be respected.137
This line of argument is central to the regime as both a legal construct and a
normative project. It is central to the legal construction of the regime in that the
lawyers and arbitrators who wield power in the system derive their authority from
the treaties. States used the treaties to subject themselves to rigorous standards
that protect investors and to refer investment disputes to arbitration. The treaties
must be interpreted and applied in light of this purpose as well as their text and
context. As a matter of positive law, this is fundamental.' 38
The weakness of this construction, however, is that the law is often silent or
ambiguous on key matters of its meaning. These matters are left to resolution by
the adjudicative process.' 39 In the case of investment treaties, there is much
uncertainty about the meaning of many of the obligations that states assumed.
Investment treaties refer to core concepts at a high level of generality. The treaties
are also not as easily revised by their authors as in the case of domestic
legislation.140 In turn, the treaties give arbitrators a central law-making role in the
exercise of their discretion about what the system should do, and the decisions of
the arbitrators are not subject to fulsome review in an independent court, whether
domestic or international. It is only part of the story, then, for Paulsson to claim
that "[a]rbitral tribunals are not to be blamed for the contents of treaties".141
Arbitrators must therefore often defend their interpretive decisions not
simply on the basis that "this is what the treaty says" but rather, "the treaty does
not answer this question, but we decided in favour of option A rather than option
B". In many awards to date, "option A" has been an interpretation of a treaty that
was expansive of the protections offered to investors and of the system's
compensatory promise for international business. As mentioned above, such
interpretations have been adopted in some cases by tribunals even where the
states party to the treaty (including the investor's home state) agreed that the
treaty called for a more restrictive interpretation.
137 Brower & Steven, supra note 60, at 195.
138 An example is provided by PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 263: "Criticism of
international tribunals on the grounds that they impede democratic policies... is
misdirected. International tribunals do not establish policy. They give effect to
international agreements.....
139 PAULSSON, Id., at 252; Brower & Steven, supra note 60, at 199-200.
140 Choudhury, supra note 18, at 788-9.
141 PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 265.

56

Trade, Law and Development

[Vol.II: 19

Beyond the legal construction of the system, moreover, there is a basic
problem with the claim that investments treaties reflect the democratic choices of
states. This is the problem that the terms of most of the treaties show little
respect for democratic choice. First, the treaties do not contain even a narrow
exception for legislative decisions, subjecting these decisions rather to the full
force of the treaty even when a legislature makes a decision of a general nature,
when it responds to a major emergency in the country, or when its decision is
supported by an overwhelming majority of the country's elected representatives.
The lack of a broad exception for general legislative measures raises doubts about
the claim of harmony between investment treaties and democracy.
In addition, investment treaties usually put time limits on the right of the
states parties to withdraw from the treaties. That is, they do not allow future
decision-makers, also duly elected, to revisit the state's decision to commit to the
system. It is true that some of the treaties allow for their cancellation by a state
party on short notice - such as 6 months in the case of NAFTA - but most give
far less opportunity for democratic reconsideration of the state's decision.
Typically, BITs apply for an initial period of 10 to 15 years and then roll over for
another 10 to 15 year period. At the time of roll over, there is often only a short
period (usually 6 months to a year) in which a state may exercise its right to
withdraw from the treaty. Thus, many of the treaties operate like inflexible term
deposits: they require the state to lock up its policies for a lengthy period with
only occasional windows of opportunity to cancel the term.
Moreover, virtually all investment treaties maintain the obligations of the
states parties for an extended period for foreign investors whose investments
existed at the time the treaty was cancelled. One may of course justify such
provisions on the basis that, if the treaties are to attract foreign investment, they
must cover a period sufficient to provide security to the relevant investors. But,
as discussed above, there are reasons to doubt whether the treaties actually serve
this end. As such, there is a strong case for the use of other means, especially the
conclusion of investment contracts, for a state to tailor their approach to foreign
investment according to its wider development strategy.142
For these reasons, it is questionable whether the investment treaty system
respects the basic principle that one elected government may not bind another
in a way that fundamentally restricts the policy options of the latter.143 In
common law, this principle is referred to as the no-fettering rule and it is an
142 J.W. Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract in International
Investment Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 121 (2008).
143 SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 18, at 189.
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important component of legislative supremacy."14 In light of this principle,
those who argue that investment treaties respect democratic decisions must
explain why the rights and privileges of investors should be locked in for
generations, while the electorate as a whole - if it rejects the investment treaty
system after learning how it operates - is required not only to elect a new
government but to do so at particular periods of time when the country's
treaties are up for renewal. Even then, the electorate's decision is subject to a
lengthy time lag during which the treaty limitations on government decisionmaking continue to apply. It is dubious to justify as democratic a decision to
constrain electorates in this way.
V. CONCLUSIONS
I have examined five justifications for an investment treaty system that has
been in ascendance since the 1990s. The discussion focused on the position of
states and other actors that make decisions about the system's costs and benefits
and about the values that are said to underlie it. The analysis suggests that
governments should exercise greater care when considering entry into the system
or, more likely, the renewal or expansion of existing treaty networks, and calls for
thorough examination of the options for reform.
The focus has been on "muscular" components of investment treaties; most
states have subjected themselves to a treaty that contains most or all of these
components. These components have also prompted the bulk of the concern
about the system as a whole. Despite this, the major capital-exporting states have
shown little interest in fundamental reform. To the extent that this stems from
justifications that were examined here, it is problematic. To the extent that it
reflects other justifications, such as the definition by major states of their national
interest as coincidental with the interests of international businesses, the system
should be debated on such terms so that governments and electorates can
respond in an informed way. Thus far, the major states' disinterest in
fundamental reform suggests that serious alternatives to the system are more
likely to emerge on a bilateral or regional basis, much as the system was grown
over time, and that they will evolve in contrast to a mainstream of investment
arbitration that is staunchly resistant to change.
At a normative level, the widespread claims that investment treaty
arbitration was designed to address inadequacies of domestic legal systems, and
to advance the rule of law through the use of international adjudication, are
undermined by the design of the treaties and by the lack of fairness and
144 A.C.L. Davies, Ultra Vires Problems in Government Contracts, 122 L.
5 (2006).
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independence in the arbitration mechanism. Because they lack institutional
safeguards of independence, investment arbitrators are vulnerable to
inappropriate influence by private actors that have clout in the arbitration
industry and by the states or business entities that dominate voting and appoint
officials in key appointing authorities. The appointing authorities are central to
the system because they have the power to decide the make-up of the tribunals,
the content of the arbitration rules, and the conduct of the process by which
awards are reviewed.
In the history of investment treaties, developing and transition states were
presented with take-it-or-leave-it offers from major capital-exporters to conclude
investment treaties that, it was said, would attract foreign investment in exchange
for commitments by capital-importing countries not to expropriate or
discriminate against foreign investors. There is now much evidence that the
promised benefit did not materialize, whereas the obligations of host states have
emerged as wide-ranging constraints on general regulations adopted in good faith
and on a non-discriminatory basis. Many states have faced the challenge of
unexpected waves of claims against them on matters of economic development,
financial security, environmental and health regulation, and so on. If reform is to
come, it is likely to originate in these countries. 145
One avenue for reform lies in the renegotiation or abrogation of investment
treaties. Another lies in reform of the institutional mechanisms and, specifically,
in the creation of alternative forums and processes for the resolution of
investment disputes. It would be beneficial to their perceived neutrality if such
alternatives were based outside of the conventional arbitration centers of Western
Europe and North America and if they surpassed the current system in terms of
their incorporation of institutional safeguards of judicial independence. However,
while all states should strive for a system that is consistent with values of fairness
independence in adjudication, it is just as critical for developing and transition
countries to formulate appropriate strategies on the investment treaty system after
careful assessment of its costs and benefits alongside those of the alternatives. 146
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Salacuse, supra note 36, at 251.
A model is that of the Republic of South Africa, supra note 55. See also Mortimore

& Stanley, supranote 25, at 33-45, 51-5.

